

the assimilating force of the imitative impulse.

Others have been derided, or neglected, and forgotten.

There are, however, limits to the spontaneity of the most eccentric of men. His wildest vagaries are circumscribed by the range of his experience.

So also with the inventive impulse. The most original designer merely expands or applies ideas that have been gathered by him from outside, or combines several of them together. Free will cannot, then, open a new and original path of action for itself: it can do no more than select one out of the various paths that are offered by instinct, by habit, by Imitation, or by reasoned inference.

It is, in fact, concerned not with invention, but with choice. The questions with which we are confronted differ immensely in complexity according as they are concerned with alternative methods of satisfying a single impulse, or with conflicting impulses. Influenced by the instinct of benevolence, we may be doubtful of the particular charities to which we should subscribe: we may hesitate over the dishes wherewith to satisfy our appetite, or, having determined upon a visit to France, over the advantages of the routes by Calais or Boulogne. These are only questions of method: but if the alternatives are very nearly balanced, neither scale being weighted by any strong feeling on our part, a

distinct effort will be needed to decide upon one or the other.

The strain upon the will is much greater when the alternative that confronts it is not one of methods, but of conflicting impulses, as, for instance, between an impulse to show ill-temper and an impulse to be kind, between an impulse to take ease and an impulse to work. In such a